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Abstract   The aim of this paper is to analyze theoretically two levels of competition 
that are relevant in tourism markets, i.e. between and within tourist destinations. In 
particular, the focus of this paper lies in the relationship between the degree of 
(exogenous) differentiation between destinations and the (endogenous) degree of 
competition within the destination. Our main result is that an increase in the intensity of 
competition between destinations induces destination managers to increase competition 
within each destination. When the intensity of competition between destinations 
increases, the incentives to increase the intensity of competition within the destination 
are higher, since the subsequent increase in price leads to a larger gain in market shares. 
However, the strategy is followed by all destinations, with the consequence that firms’ 
profits in both destinations are dispersed in a “prisoner’s dilemma” scenario, reinforcing 
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1.  Introduction  
 
In tourism, competition occurs at two levels. First, competition occurs among tourist 
destinations, countries or regions. If we consider countries as level of analysis, recent 
years have witnessed a significant increase in the degree of international competition, 
triggered by factors like the reduction of transportation costs and the ICT revolution. 
New destinations emerged, leading to a sharp reduction in the concentration of 
international arrivals. Second, competition occurs among firms offering similar goods 
or services and located in the same tourist destination. This paper will focus on 
accommodation, where recent years have witnessed an increase in supply in most 
countries which can be interpreted an increase of competition within each destination. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze theoretically the interplay between the two levels of 
competition, between and within tourist destinations.  In the model, two destinations 
compete for tourists from the rest of the world. The destinations are differentiated both 
vertically and horizontally. Differentiation is related to natural and cultural attractions 
that are present in the destination, and to geographical distance from tourists’ place of 
origin. The degree of differentiation between destinations is exogenous.  
In each destination, tourists consume a single “good”, i.e. hospitality. Within each 
destination, hospitality is a homogenous good offered by hotels located in the 
destination. Homogeneity implies that hotels within each destination face the same 
price, are of the same size and obtain the same profits. However, given differentiation 
between destinations, price, hotels’ size and profits differ between destinations. 
The destination manager in each destination chooses the number of hotels, in order to 
maximize hotels total profits in the destination in a simultaneous-move game. Choosing 
the number of firms, the destination manager determines the intensity of competition 
within the destination, and ultimately the price of accommodation.  
The focus of this paper lies in the relationship between the degree of (exogenous) 
differentiation between destinations and the (endogenous) degree of competition within 
the destination. Our main result is that an increase in the intensity of competition 
between destinations induces destination managers to increase competition within 
destination. When the intensity of competition between destinations increases, the 
incentives to increase the intensity of competition within the destination are higher,   3
since the subsequent increase in price leads to a larger gain in market shares. However, 
this strategy is followed by both destinations, with the consequence that hotels profits in 
both destinations are dispersed in a “prisoner’s dilemma” scenario. 
 
Recent papers investigated each single level of competition in isolation. For instance, 
Cellini and Candela (2006) consider a dynamic model of competition between tourist 
destinations, which are taken as the sole unit of analysis. Strategic pricing of hotels has 
been considered by Mudambi (1994), while Pintassilgo and Silva (2007) modelled the 
effect of hotels’ entry and environmental quality in a single destination. Calveras (2007) 
models the formation of hotel chains in the case of two destinations, but he takes as 
given the initial number of hotels. Some papers have considered other type of relations 
between tourist firms than competition. Calveras and Vera-Hernandez (2005) 
investigate the vertical relations between tour operators and hotels, and their impact on 
environmental qualities, within a destination. Wachsman (2006) models the strategic 
interaction between hotels and airlines, when two destinations compete, and one hotel 
and one airline operate in each destination. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to 
consider the interaction between the two levels of competition. 
1 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is introduced and 
solved. In Section 3, we derive the main implications of the model, and we discuss them 
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes and points at further extensions of the model.   
 
2.  The model 
 
2.1 The set-up 
 
Our model considers competition between two destinations (destinations 1 and 2) for 
attracting tourist from the rest of the world. Tourists consume a single good, i.e. 
                                                 
1 With respect to the international trade literature, our model shows similarities with Richardson (1999). 
This author considers the competition between two countries, whose firms offer homogenous product. 
Government chooses trade policies (the level of trade tariffs) and competition policies (the number of 
firms in each country). To this set-up, we add horizontal and vertical differentiation between the 
“products” offered by firms in each country.  
   4
hospitality, which is offered by competing hotels in each destination, and destination 
managers decide the number of hotels in their managed destination.  
 
The model assumes two stages. In the first stage, destination managers choose 
simultaneously the number of hotels in the destination. The assumption that the number 
of firms is chosen by government in the accommodation sector is not too unrealistic. 
Operating a hotel usually requires an authorization, and in any case governments have 
the power to influence the extension of the area in which hotels can be built. In the 
second stage, hotels compete à la Cournot, choosing quantities (i.e. their size). 
Following Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), we interpret the Cournot game as the reduced 
form of a game where firms choose first their productive capacity and then compete in 
prices. Since capacity constraints are relevant for hotels, Cournot competition appears 
as a reasonable assumption. From tourists’ point of view, the good is homogenous 
within the destination but differentiated across destinations.
2 The interpretation of this 
assumption is that, while the accommodation services offered by hotels are 
homogenous, destinations are vertically and horizontally differentiated for non-traded 
characteristics, such as natural or cultural attractions, and horizontally differentiated 
according to the geographical distance from the tourist place of origin. 
 
In the second stage, the number of firms in each destination is given. I  is the set of 
firms in destination 1,  1 n  is the number of firms and  I i  the generic firm. Similarly, J  
is the set of firms in destination 2,  2 n is the number of firms and  J j  the generic firm. 
Firms (independently from their location) have identical costs functions with zero fixed 
costs and marginal costs normalized to zero as well. 









i q q A p  1 1                                                   (1) 
                                                 
2 In the international trade literature, the hypothesis of differentiation by country of origin is known as 
“Armington hypothesis”, following Armington (1969). 







i q q A p  2 2                                                   (2) 
 
1 A  and  2 A  are positive parameters related to consumers willingness to pay, or market 
size, in each destination. We allow for asymmetries between destinations (while 
assuming, without loss of generality, that 2 1 A A  ), and then   2 1 A A   is a measure of 
degree of vertical differentiation.  ) 1 ; 0 [    is a measure of substitutability between 
products offered in the two destinations, then an inverse measure of horizontal 
differentiation and a direct measure of intensity of competition.  
 
In the first stage,  destination managers choose simultaneously the number of hotels in 
their destination. Their objective function is given by destination hotels total profits in 









j n W ) ( 2 2 . This hypothesis is justified by tourists not being destinations’ citizens.  
 
2.2 The second stage 
 
We solve the model backwards. In the second stage, generic firms i and j chooses  i q  
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The first order conditions are: 
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Invoking symmetry,  1 q qi    I i  , and   2 q q j    J j     we obtain: 
 
0 1 2 2 1 1 1     q q n q n A                                                        (7) 
0 2 1 1 2 2 2     q q n q n A                                                        (8) 
 
In equilibrium, the quantity produced by the representative firm in each destination is: 
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Plugging (9) and (10) into (3) and (4), we get equilibrium profits for the representative 








2 ) (q   . 
The comparative statics on Eqs (10) and (11) provides the expected results. Focusing on 
destination 1 (the case for destination 2 is symmetric), we obtain that an increase in 
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since an increase in  1 A  leads to higher marginal revenues for any level of  1 q . For a 
symmetric argument, an increase in the quality of the other destination (an increase in 
2 A ) has a negative effect, unless  0   :  
0
) 1 ( 1
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An increase in the intensity of competition, both within destination (increase in  1 n ) and 
in the other destination (increase in  ) 2 n  leads to lower size in equilibrium:  
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Finally, we consider the effect of variation of   on hotels’ size in equilibrium:  
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 (15) has an ambiguous sign. In order to provide an easier interpretation, consider a 
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 . The relationship between hotel size and the 
intensity of competition is U-shaped. This result comes from two opposing effects. An 
increase in   means lower price for given quantity offered by foreign hotels, which has 
a negative effect on 
*
1 q ; however, it also increases the demand elasticity of the 
individual firm, leading to larger output by each hotel. It turns out that the sum of the 
two effects is minimized at an intermediate value of  . 
 
2.3 The first stage 
 
In the first stage, destination managers choose simultaneously the number of firms 
active in destination. We assume that destination manager maximize the total profits of 
hotels in the destination: 
2 *
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The first order conditions are: 
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Those conditions can be simplified and become: 
 




2 1 2 1
1
1         


  n n n n n n
n
W
                               (20) 




2 1 2 1
2
        


  n n n n n n
n
W
                               (21) 
 
Eqs (20) and (21) implicitly define the best response function for each destination 
manager, i.e. the number of hotels which maximize hotels total profits given the number 
of hotels in the other destination. In an explicit form, the best response functions 
respectively appear as:  
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We analyze now the slopes of best response functions. Considering destination 1 and 
deriving, we obtain: 
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which is always positive. In the terminology of Bulow et al. (1985), the game played by 
the destination managers is a game with strategic complements. We represent the two 
best response functions in Figure 1. The Nash equilibrium is given by their intersection. 
The graphical representation, together with economic intuition, suggests that the 
equilibrium is symmetric. Then, imposing 
*
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Figure 1: Best response functions and equlibrium 
 
 
3. Between and within destination competition 
 
In this paper, our focus lies in the relation between the intensity of competition between 
destination (which is assumed to exogenous) and the intensity of competition within a 
                                                 
3 It can be verified that second order conditions are satisfied. We shall assume that parameters are such 
that interiority of equilibrium is guaranteed in both destinations.  
1 n  
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destination, which is endogenous and measured by the number of firms which operate 
in the destination.  
The first thing we note from Eq. (25) is that the number of hotels active in each 
destination is independent from  1 A  and  2 A . This leads to our first proposition: 
 
Proposition 1:  The number of firms active in each destination is the same and 
independent from destination quality. 
 
1 A  and  2 A  affect the size of hotels in equilibrium (the larger is the market size of a 
destination, the larger is the size of hotels in equilibrium in the destination), but not the 
number of hotels.  
In order to understand the intuition, consider the case of  0    (i.e. destinations are 
local monopolists). In this case,  1
*  n . Independently from market size, local 
government willing to maximize industry choose monopoly, because any market 
structure would disperse profits. The same logic extends to  0   . In this result, the 
assumption of homogenous hotels is crucial. In presence of within-destination product 
differentiation, hotels could create their own demand, with limited “business stealing” 
effects.  
From Eq. (25) we see instead that the number of hotels chosen by the local government 
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Proposition 2: the number of hotels active in each destination, and then the intensity of 
competition within the destination,  is increasing in the intensity of competition between 
the destinations.  
 
The intuition of this result is the following. We first note that equilibrium number of 
hotels results from the interaction of two forces operating in opposite directions. First, 
there is a “profit dissipating” effect: when a local government increases the number of 
hotels, part of the profits within the destination are dispersed for the increase in   11
competition. Second, there is a “market share” effect. An increase in the number of 
firms in a destination, given the number of firms in the other destination, leads to a 
reduction in price, and then an increase in destination market share. 
When the horizontal differentiation between the two destinations is low, a given 
reduction a price has a significant effect on destination “sales”. For this reason, local 
government find aggressive price strategies attractive, exactly as firms do in standard 
models of oligopoly interaction (Tirole, 1988).  The way in which local governments 
“control” prices is through the intensity of competition within the destination: the higher 
is the intensity, the lower is the price.  Then, an increase in   leads to an increase in the 
number of firms. From the point of view of overall welfare in the world tourism market, 
Proposition 2 implies that an increase in the intensity of competition between 
destinations redistribute wealth from destination places to origin places through two 
effects: a direct effect (for given number of firms in each destination) and indirect 
(induced) effect, operating for the variation in number of firms, which reinforces the 
direct effect.  
 
4. Discussion  
 
In this section we discuss some implications of the results we obtained, and, at the same 
time, we discuss how the results could vary if some assumptions are relaxed.  
The main point of this paper is that an increase in competition between destinations 
leads destination managers towards a policy intervention (increasing the intensity of 
competition within the destination) which in fact worsens overall firms performance in 
the destination, although maximizing firms profit is the destination manager’s objective. 
This apparently paradoxical result can be understood if one considers that destination 
managers are not concerned with incumbent (i.e. before the increase in competition) 
hotels only, but with potential entrants as w e l l .  I n  f a c t ,  o n e  could argue that for 
“political economy” considerations incumbent hotels could “lobby” to avoid an increase 
in the number of firms. Interestingly, notice that the ability of destination managers to 
commit to a given number of firms in face of increased competition would benefit the 
destination, by increasing welfare as we defined it.    12
A second point relates to the possible presence of externalities that we rule out by 
assumption. The first type of externality is dynamic, and it refers to the negative effect 
of the number of firms on environmental quality, as in Pintassilgo and Silva (2007). If 
local governments fail to internalize this effect, our model suggests that increased in 
competition between destinations can harm tourism sustainability in the long run, a 
result which appears consistent with anectodical evidence.  Another type of externality 
could occur to respect to destination residents. In principle, negative or positive 
externality could exist, which would imply a number of hotels which is higher or lower 
than the social optimum, if governments fail to consider the effects on residents.  
Finally, there are two main policy implications from our results. The first one refers to 
the opportunity of coordination if the two destinations belong to the same political 
entity. The prisoner’s dilemma type of game, indeed, implies that in this case 
destinations would be better off if the choice of competition intensity within each 
destination is centralized in a single authority. The second implication refers to the 
nature of competition among destinations. In this paper, in fact, we focused on price 
competition, since prices are what destination managers control “manipulating” the 
level of competition in their destinations. Price competition, however, tends to harm 
firms (in favour consumers). This is true for tourist destinations as well. One could 
imagine a set-up where tourism competition is influenced by investments in destination 
quality or characteristics. In this scenario, destination managers could in fact try to 
reduce the intensity of price competition by increasing the “artificial” level of 
differentiation among destinations.   
 
5. Conclusions  
 
In this paper we presented a model that investigates the interplay of competition within 
and between tourist destinations. The focus lies in the relationship between the degree 
of (exogenous) differentiation between destinations and the (endogenous) degree of 
competition within the destination. Our main result is that an increase in the intensity of 
competition between destinations induces destination managers to increase competition 
within the destination. This implies that an increase in the intensity of competition 
between destinations redistributes wealth from destination places to origin places   13
through two effects: a direct effect (for given number of firms in each destination) and 
an indirect (induced) effect, operating for the variation in the number of firms, which 
reinforces the direct effect. Several extensions of the model are possible, some of them 
mentioned in the previous section. In general, one could imagine of enriching both the 
description of competition between destinations, and the nature of destination as a 
system of firms. At the level of competition among destinations, one could have a 
dynamic model in which the degree of vertical and horizontal differentiation is 
endogenous. At the level of destination system, an interesting venue could be the 
analysis of firms offering different type of goods and services (accommodation, boards, 
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